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RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED CONDUCT, WHY 
THAT’S BAD, AND HOW TO STOP IT
JEFF NELSON*
ABSTRACT
This Note examines the current state of the law that seemingly allows individuals 
to harm and discriminate against others on the basis of their protected religious beliefs. 
This Note also explores how such a result has been made possible and how it may be 
stymied by judicial and legislative action.
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“‘Raise your hand, Christian conservatives, everybody. Raise your hand if 
you’re not a Christian conservative. I want to see this, right. Oh, there’s a 
couple people, that’s all right,’ Trump said smiling, waving his hand in the 
air. ‘I think we’ll keep them. Should we keep them in the room? Yes? I 
think so.’”
-The Washington Post quoting Donald J. Trump1
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of January 23, 2012, Paul Mathis and David Peppelman argued 
over Mathis’s refusal to display a Christian mission statement on his employment 
identification badge, resulting in Mathis losing his job.2 Mathis was not discharged 
because he was a bad employee or because he found a better job; he did not return to 
college or win the lottery.3 Instead, Mathis argued that Peppelman, a born-again 
Christian, fired him because he was an atheist and because he refused to listen to 
Peppelman aggressively proselytize Christianity at work.4 On that same day, Mathis 
discussed personal problems with his coworker. After overhearing that conversation, 
Peppelman proclaimed that “[Mathis] wouldn’t have all those problems in [his] life if 
[he] went to church with [him].”5
After Mathis was discharged, he initiated an employment discrimination action 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and, in defense to 
that suit, Peppelman maintained that “accommodating [Mathis] would substantially 
burden [his] sincerely held religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.”6 Individuals might find comfort in knowing Mathis does not win on 
this argument, but a lot has changed since 2012.7 Taking the position that Peppelman’s 
conduct was egregious is reasonable but then begs the question: how could Peppelman 
have felt his actions were legally justified based on his religious beliefs?8
                                                          
1 President Trump speaking as a presidential candidate at a campaign rally in Iowa. Jose 
A. DelReal, Trump Jokes About People Who Are Not Conservative Christians: “Should We 
Keep Them?”, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2016/09/28/should-we-keep-them-trump-jokes-about-non-christian-conservatives-
at-iowa-rally/?utm_term=.1c5ca69f58ce.




5 Id. at 322.
6 Id. at 320.
7 The federal law Peppelman cites, which will be discussed infra, does not generally allow 
suits between private parties, causing the argument to fail. Id. at 328.
8 Others have felt that the nature of their religious freedom justified their questionable 
behavior. For example, in Indiana, a woman beat her child with a hanger and cited the Bible 
and religious freedom laws as justification. Vic Ryckaert, Son Had 36 Bruises. Mom Quoted 
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Peppelman might have felt justified because the United States chose a distinct 
route with how it balances the interests of individual religious beliefs within society—
a route that strongly protects the religious believer.9 The United States legal 
framework empowers the religious believer; from the very text of the Constitution, the 
First Amendment asserts that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion].”10 What’s more, the United States has enacted federal and state 
laws that increase the level of religious protection afforded by the Constitution, 
generally dubbed “Religious Freedom Restoration Acts” (“RFRAs”).11 The federal 
version of RFRA, the linchpin of this Note, uses a balancing test and proscribes the 
government from substantially burdening the free exercise of religion without a 
compelling reason, and even then, only by the least restrictive means.12
Federal and state RFRAs?the new norm?have proven to be highly controversial 
pieces of legislation,13 undoubtedly because they address the most fervently disputed 
issue of human history: religious disputes.14 Although the resolution of Paul Mathis’s 
case may be a relief to those not wanting religion to be a permissible defense to 
discrimination, the era where similar resolutions are possible is ending, if not already 
over. In recent years, RFRAs undeniably have skewed too much protection in favor 
of the individual believer, allowing him in some circumstances to actively 
discriminate against others on the basis of a religious belief, thereby setting a bleak 
                                                          
9 From the Hasidic Jewish population in Brooklyn to the Amish living in the heart of Ohio, 
we proudly see individuals practicing their religion free from fear of oppression. See Inside the 
Community: A Holy Life, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/alifeapart/intro_2.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2018); Ohio America, AMISH AM., http://amishamerica.com/ohio-amish/ (last visited Apr. 4, 
2018).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”).
11 Currently twenty-one states have RFRAs with varying language, including: Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. State Religious Freedom Acts, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS
(May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.
12 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a)–(b)(2) (1993).
13 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Case for Evidence-Based Free Exercise Accommodation: 
Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Bad Public Policy, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
129, 160 (2015) (“From the perspective of good public policy and especially transparency, 
RFRA fails at every level. Its misleading title, opaque content, and the deceptive practices of its 
promoters yielded a feel-good, but dangerous law that increases the odds that the vulnerable 
will be harmed and that powerful interests will turn it to ends previously unimagined.”).
14 The number of different viewpoints even within major religions is staggering. According 
to the Pew Research Center, active believers in the family of “Christianity” can be divided into 
Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Historically Black Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, 
Orthodox Christian, Jehovah’s Witness, and Other Christian with each one having its own sub-
categories. Religious Landscape Study, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2018).
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precedent for the future.15 Because RFRA balancing tests are harming United States 
citizens, society must rethink the interpretation and application of these laws so that 
the balance of interests becomes more equitable and fair.
Judicial decisions and a misguided interpretation regarding these RFRA statutes 
lead to the harmful effects of RFRA legislation.16 RFRA statutes protect the “exercise 
of religion,” an overbroad and ambiguous term that the courts have never properly 
addressed or clarified.17 Narrowing the definition of “exercise of religion” to exclude 
discriminatory conduct will help mitigate these statutes’ discriminatory effects from 
which more vulnerable and minority populations suffer. Aside from a moral argument, 
to further illustrate that narrowing the purview of RFRA statutes is the correct course, 
constitutional principles support a revised interpretation of RFRAs. A constitutional 
violation occurs when a court adjudicates and decides a controversy under RFRA 
where an individual has discriminated against or refused service to another on the basis 
of a religious belief because the court is violating the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits the government from favoring one religion over another.18 Individual 
believers should not fear that a revised interpretation of RFRA statutes will transform 
the United States to one that discourages religion or violently opposes it. To the 
contrary, society will be working toward the delicate balance that reasonably protects 
individual religious beliefs and avoids the harmful discrimination and humiliation of 
others.
Section II of this Note discusses a short history of the First Amendment’s Free 
Exercise Clause leading up to Religious Freedom Restoration Acts. Section II also 
includes an examination of both the real and possible harmful effects of RFRAs, 
current reactions to the application of these laws domestically, and interesting parallels 
internationally. Section III sets forth an argument that certain forms of harmful 
conduct, by nature of RFRAs’ plain language or by explicit legislative enactment, can 
be excluded from RFRAs’ application. Section III also argues that the government 
violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution when it adjudicates religiously 
motivated discrimination between private parties.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Free Exercise
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the 
free exercise [of religion].”19 Like many constitutional doctrines, the interpretation of 
this language evolved over time.20 In the mid-twentieth century in Sherbert v. Verner,
                                                          
15 See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 
201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841, 847–48 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (allowing a funeral home to fire a 
transgender employee and assert a religious belief as justification), rev’d and remanded sub 
nom. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 
560 (6th Cir. 2018).
16 See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 135–50.
17 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment 
Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831 (2009).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19 Id.
20 John Fahner, Free Conscience in Decline: The Insignificance of the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Role of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in the Wake of Hobby Lobby, 2 BELMONT 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss4/7
2018] TIPPED SCALES 755
the Supreme Court held that a balancing test applied to claims where the government 
allegedly intruded upon an individual’s religious exercise, requiring that where the 
government substantially burdens the rights to exercise religion, the law or action had 
to further a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means.21 This Sherbert test 
did not last; almost three decades later, the Supreme Court overruled the Sherbert
balancing test when it held that the government is allowed to burden the free exercise 
of religion as long as the burden comes from a generally applicable law that only 
incidentally intrudes upon the exercise of religion.22 In direct response, Congress 
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to restore the previous Sherbert
balancing test.23 The statute read:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
                                                          
L. REV. 185, 186 (2015) (“The current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is entirely 
severed from its historical moorings, and modern jurisprudence takes no account of the 
reverence to which its authors attributed it. There exists today only a disparate reflection of the 
traditional right of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.”).
21 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). The Court seems to make this decision 
in reverence to the fact that there are legitimate competing interests. The Court stated:
The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental 
regulation of religious beliefs as such . . . [but] [o]n the other hand, the Court has rejected 
challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt 
acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for “even when the action is in accord 
with one’s religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions” . . . 
[when] [t]he conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial 
threat to public safety, peace or order.
Id. at 402–03.
22 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 892 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb–4 (1993). The Court narrows the 
Sherbert test to its facts and denies a balancing test: 
The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially 
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, “cannot 
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s
spiritual development.” To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a law 
contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State’s 
interest is “compelling”—permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, “to become a law unto 
himself.”
Id. at 885 (citations omitted).
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb–4. Congress explicitly stated their intention was “to 
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and to guarantee its application in all cases where 
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened . . . .” Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
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Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only 
if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.24
After the Supreme Court held that this act was unconstitutional as applied to the 
states,25 individual states began passing their own RFRA legislation of the same name 
with similar language.26 As a result, today the individual religious believer enjoys a 
patchwork of protection divided between the United States Constitution and federal 
and state legislation.
B. The Harmful Effect of RFRAs
The harmful effects of RFRAs are very real, but claiming that RFRAs have no 
benefit to both the individual and society would be both unfair and untrue. Recent 
examples of the federal RFRA’s balancing test demonstrate the protection individuals 
of minority religions have from restrictive government regulation.27 The examples of 
protection from government meddling illustrate the best of all possible outcomes of 
RFRA statutes. Of course, most Americans agree religious believers should be free 
from oppression, but what happens if the protected religious belief is oppressive to 
others?
While the broad language of RFRAs does not provide an individual an explicit 
carte blanche to discriminate, an individual may now use the statute to assert a 
religious belief even if that belief intrudes upon the life and belief system of someone 
else.28 Although that position is not true, discussing RFRA legislation would be nearly 
                                                          
24 Id. § 2000bb–1(a)–(b)(2).
25 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
26 See State Religious Freedom Acts, supra note 11.
27 See, e.g., McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that the government had not met its burden of establishing that they did not violate the 
federal RFRA when they confiscated eagle feathers (used for religious ceremonial purposes) 
from a west Texas Native American tribe); Singh v. McHugh, 185 F. Supp. 3d 201, 232, 233 
(D.D.C. 2016) (allowing a practicing Sikh to continue to wear his religious clothing while 
participating in his university’s ROTC program).
28 Another domain in which individuals have the religious right to discriminate to some 
extent is called the “Ministerial Exception,” which generally immunizes faith-based 
organizations from employment suits by their ministers. See Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 
No. 1:11–CV–00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012). The proper contours of 
the doctrine are somewhat disputed. See generally Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the 
Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011). However, this system can be abused much like 
RFRA statutes. In Collette v. Archdiocese of Chi., 200 F. Supp. 3d 730, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2016), a 
parish asserted the ministerial exception when it fired its Director of Worship and Music, who 
may or may not technically be a minister, for intending to marry his same sex partner. Whether 
the parish will be deemed justified is unclear, as the case was only at the motion to dismiss 
phase. Id. at 735–36.
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss4/7
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impossible without discussing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.29 In the federal RFRA’s most 
infamous appearance, a for-profit corporation was able to deny contraceptive 
coverage?as mandated by the Affordable Care Act?to female employees on the 
basis of the corporation’s religious belief.30 The majority of the Court had little trouble 
reaching this decision; following the federal RFRA’s balancing test, they determined 
the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the corporation’s sincerely held 
religious beliefs.31 The corporation believed that “life begins at conception . . . . 
therefore object[ing] on religious grounds to providing health insurance that covers 
methods of birth control that . . . may result in the destruction of an embryo.”32 The 
Court applied the balancing test and found that the government had “not shown that it 
lacks other means of achieving its desired goal [of mandating contraception] without 
imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties in 
these cases.”33 Thus, because the contraceptive mandate was not the least restrictive 
means of achieving the government’s goal, the Court held the mandate violated the 
law.34 Here, the corporation’s35 religious belief was protected, but this time other 
people were at the end of the belief rather than a pure government regulation.36 The 
corporation effectively and categorically singled out and refused service to a class of 
individuals (women seeking contraceptives) on the basis of protecting an individual 
corporate believer.37
Intuitively, access to contraceptives is not the only issue that religious individuals 
can assert; a foray of differing claims may arise under this precedent. After Hobby 
Lobby, some commentators foresaw that the decision was the beginning of a new era 
that emboldens RFRA claims against anti-discrimination laws.38 One such 
commentator said:
A for-profit corporation can now seek such an exemption under RFRA if 
its owners have religious objections. To meet the “substantial burden” 
requirement, it appears that all a business’s owners need to do is truthfully 
                                                          
29 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
30 See id. at 2759.
31 Id. at 2779
32 Id. at 2775.
33 Id. at 2780.
34 Id. at 2780, 2785.
35 A source of controversy in this decision was that the court extended RFRA protections 
to closely held corporations. Eugene Volokh, Hobby Lobby Wins Before the Supreme Court,
WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/06/30/scotusblog-reports-closely-held-corporations-cannot-be-required-
to-provide-contraception-coverage/?utm_term=.4b06196e4fa2. The Court relied on the 
Dictionary Act to determine that a “person” for the purposes of the federal RFRA “include[s] 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, 
as well as individuals.” Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
36 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
37 Id. at 2759.
38 Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions 
from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 71 (2015).
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
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assert that they believe that their faith calls on them not to employ persons 
who have certain characteristics or engage in certain conduct. Once the 
owners do so, the anti-discrimination prohibition at issue must meet an 
“exceptionally demanding” “least-restrictive means standard.”39
Unfortunately, it seems this position is becoming a reality.
A striking 2016 case seemed to extend Hobby Lobby in the way many had feared, 
but a recent reversal on appeal suggests that courts may have begun to recognize the 
harmful effects of RFRAs. In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. R.G. & 
G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., a federal district court applied the federal RFRA 
balancing test and allowed a funeral home to assert RFRA as a defense when the 
funeral home fired a transgender employee for violating the company dress code.40
The defendant funeral home’s sincere religious belief went undisputed; the district 
court found that the “[defendant] believes that the ‘Bible teaches that a person’s sex 
(whether male or female) is an immutable God-given gift and that it is wrong for a 
person to deny his or her God-given sex.’”41 The district court determined that the 
employee was not a protected class under Title VII, and the decision of this case was 
in part because of the narrow nature of the discrimination.42 Accordingly, the 
defendants succeeded on the merits of their RFRA claim and were not liable for their 
religiously motivated termination because, like in Hobby Lobby, the substantial 
burden43 imposed on the funeral home’s religious belief was not the least restrictive 
means of achieving the government’s substantial interest.44 However, in March of 
2018, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision in part, ruling that “a
religious claimant cannot rely on customers’ presumed biases to establish a substantial 
burden under RFRA.”45 Both the district court and appellate court cases illustrate the 
challenge that the federal RFRA’s “least restrictive means” requirement presents. 
Because of that challenge, many more instances of discrimination may be allowed 
because of narrow factual circumstances, as evidenced by this district court’s 
decision.46
                                                          
39 Id.
40 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. 
Supp. 3d 837, 840 (E.D. Mich. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 884 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 
2018).
41 Id. at 848.
42 Id at 861–63.
43 The court assumed this fact without deciding. Id. at 859.
44 Id. at 860. With an emphasis that each RFRA analysis is fact specific to the individual 
case, the district court asserted that “the EEOC has not provided a focused ‘to the person’ 
analysis of how the burden on the Funeral Home’s religious exercise is the least restrictive 
means of eliminating clothing gender stereotypes at the Funeral Home under the facts and 
circumstances presented here.” Id.
45 R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 568 (6th Cir. 2018).
46 In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun observed that “‘least drastic means’ is a 
slippery slope . . . [a] judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with 
something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby 
enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.” Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers 
Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188–89 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss4/7
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To further illustrate the discriminatory effect of RFRA legislation, states without 
enacted RFRA statutes do not have such an effect. In two recent instances, courts in 
Colorado and New York have deflated businesses’ attempts to discriminate against 
LGBT customers.47 In the New York case, Gifford v. McCarthy, owners of a wedding 
venue did not wish to hold a same-sex wedding despite a human rights law mandating 
the contrary.48 Much like the instances above, the defendants in this case had an 
indisputable religious belief.49 However, because the court was not bound by a RFRA 
statute’s balancing test, the court relied on the Free Exercise Clause of the federal 
Constitution.50 The court reasoned that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his [or 
her] religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”51 In both Gifford and Masterpiece Cakeshop,
the Colorado case, neither defendant won the right to discriminate.52 As a 
consequence, because of the lack of influence by a RFRA balancing test, the courts 
seem to have an easier time quelling discriminatory conduct.
C. The Increasing Discriminatory Potential of RFRAs
The discriminatory incidents thus far involve the federal RFRA, but as discussed 
supra, the federal act is one of many. The enacting of state RFRAs has become a 
fruitful endeavor because the Supreme Court held the original federal RFRA 
unconstitutional as applied to the states.53 Since that decision, twenty-one state 
legislatures have enacted RFRAs,54 and as the years progress, the statutes are 
beginning to diverge in language. Some states have a standard RFRA that mirrors the 
federal version and employs the same standard balancing test.55 Other states have 
subtly changed the language of the balancing standard to arguably strengthen the 
objecting believer’s position.56 More recently, some RFRA statutes expand the law to 
allow suits between private parties,57 which the federal RFRA was not designed to 
                                                          
47 See Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted 
sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017); 
Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
48 Gifford, 23 N.Y.S.3d at 426.
49 Id. at 429.
50 Id. at 429–31.
51 Id. at 430 (quoting Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
52 Id. at 431; Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d at 283.
53 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
54 State Religious Freedom Acts, supra note 11.
55 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 761.03(1)(a)–(b) (2018).
56 For example, in Missouri, the state legislature has modified the standard RFRA language 
that the government may not “substantially burden” a person’s free exercise with language that 
the government may not “restrict” a person’s free exercise of religion without a compelling 
interest, arguably weakening the strict balancing test. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302 (2018).
57 IND. CODE § 34–13–9–9 (2018). The statute does not explicitly assert that it applies to 
suits between private parties; however, it states:
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2018
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do.58 In 2016, twelve states had pending RFRAs, indicating the potential for similar 
legislation in the future.59 The increasing number of jurisdictions with RFRAs along 
with weakening judicial standards create prime conditions for more religiously 
imposed discrimination.60
The foundation is laid for legislators to pass even more ambitious statutes. In 2016, 
the Mississippi legislature crossed the boundary between enacting a seemingly well-
meaning RFRA statute that may have a discriminatory effect and passing a law with 
an explicit discriminatory intent.61 The Mississippi bill would protect the religious 
beliefs of those who do not believe in same-sex marriage and allow them to 
discriminate against the LGBT community.62 However, that bill did not take effect 
because a federal district court intervened and granted an injunction based on the 
Establishment Clause that will be discussed in Section III of this Note.63
Lastly, the executive branch has thrown its hat into the ring. The climate 
surrounding the 2016 presidential election can be most optimistically described as 
charged, and the Trump administration can be described as controversial, at best. 
Donald Trump indicated that he seeks to embolden the position that religious believers 
deserve an increased right to act according to their beliefs. For example, he endorses 
                                                          
A person whose exercise of religion has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be 
substantially burdened, by a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or 
impending violation as a claim or defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding, 
regardless of whether the state or any other governmental entity is a party to the 
proceeding.
Id. The key language is “whether the state or any other governmental entity is a party to the 
proceeding . . . .” Id.
58 See, e.g., Mathis v. Christian Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 317, 328 
(E.D. Pa. 2016); see also Sara Lunsford Kohen, Religious Freedom in Private Lawsuits: 
Untangling When RFRA Applies to Suits Involving Only Private Parties, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 43, 45 (2011) (discussing that the circuits are split as to whether even the 
federal RFRA applies to suits between private parties).
59 See Anti-LGBT Religious Exemption Legislation Across the Country, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/anti-lgbt-religious-exemption-legislation-across-country#rfra16 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
60 For example, the employer in Mathis might have an actual defense to his termination suit 
if the altercation took place in a jurisdiction that supported RFRA suits between private parties.
61 The bill lists three “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” entitled to
protection. They are:
(a) Marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman;
(b) Sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and
(c) Male (man) or female (woman) refer to an individual’s immutable biological sex as 
objectively determined by anatomy and genetics at time of birth.
H.B. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016).
62 Id.
63 Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 693–94 (S.D. Miss. 2016), rev’d, 860 F.3d 345 
(5th Cir. 2017).
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the destruction of the Johnson Amendment, which prohibits religious organizations 
from making political endorsements.64 Trump stated:
Freedom of religion is a sacred right, but it is also a right under threat all 
around us . . . . That is why I will get rid of and totally destroy the Johnson 
Amendment and allow our representatives of faith to speak freely and 
without fear of retribution.65
Of course, President Trump would need congressional support, and like many 
presidents, he may simply be pandering to his base. But, ignoring such a statement is 
impossible when said in a climate of judicial decisions and legislative enactments that 
tend to rigorously protect certain religious individuals’ conduct even if that conduct 
infringes upon another.66 Thus, the third and last branch of government has entered 
the debate and effectively has said that religious individuals are not protected 
enough.67 If society at large follows this viewpoint, then the balance of interests will 
further skew in favor of the religious believer, threatening the dignity of United States 
citizens targeted by discriminatory religious beliefs.
D. Reactions to RFRAs
While courts have trouble applying RFRAs in a way that does not allow 
discrimination, some of the political reactions to the discriminatory effects of RFRAs 
are poignant. The governor of Georgia recently vetoed a Religious Liberty Bill that 
would have allowed “pastors to opt out of performing same-sex weddings and would 
have given religious organizations the ability to refuse certain services, including 
charitable services, if doing so clashed with their religious beliefs.”68 The governor 
decided to veto the bill, explaining, “‘I do not think we have to discriminate against 
anyone to protect the faith-based community in Georgia, which I and my family have 
been a part of for generations . . . .’”69
The fight against religiously motivated harm has made rounds in the legislative 
branch as well. Proposed federal legislation called the “Do Not Harm Act” would 
protect individuals who are discriminated against on the basis of religion.70 The intent 
of the law is to clarify that the federal RFRA “should not be interpreted to authorize 
                                                          
64 Mark Landler & Laurie Goodstein, Trump Vows to ‘Destroy’ Law Banning Political 
Endorsements by Churches, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/us/politics/trump-johnson-amendment-political-
activity-churches.html?_r=0.
65 Id. (emphasis added).
66 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 761.03(1)(a)–(b) (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.302 (2018); Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
67 See Landler & Goodstein, supra note 64.
68 Sandhya Somashekhar, Georgia Governor Vetoes Religious Freedom Bill Criticized as 




70 See Do Not Harm Act, H.R. 5272, 114th Cong. (2016), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5272/text.
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an exemption from generally applicable law that imposes the religious views, habits, 
or practices of one party upon another” or to authorize “an exemption from generally 
applicable law that imposes meaningful harm, including dignitary harm, on a third 
party . . . .”71
These reactions imply that change may be waiting down the road, but United States 
citizens are in danger of discrimination today. It would be foolhardy to assume that 
twenty-one states and the federal government are going to change the language or 
overturn their own bills, as RFRAs do have some inherent value.72 The course to 
change need not be political; the legal community should take a good hard look at how 
it interprets these statutes in a way that avoids blatant and absurd discriminatory 
effects.
E. RFRA-Like Disputes from Around the World
The United States is not isolated in its efforts to promote religious harmony among 
its population; other western states must also balance the diverse needs of individual 
religious groups. This Section looks at illustrations of nuanced religious disputes in 
modern foreign states, some of which mirror exactly the delicate issues facing the 
United States. These cases shine as examples where a modern state has settled a 
religious dispute in a manner that benefits society as a whole rather than any unique 
individual.
The first example comes from the sunny paradise of the French Riviera that started 
as a response to recent terror attacks,73 a result of state endorsed secularism,74 or both. 
Certain towns along the French Riviera had infamously decided to ban the Islamic 
women’s full-bodied swimsuit dubbed the “Burkini.” 75 In effect, a woman who chose 
                                                          
71 Id. § 2. Exact language in the bill is as follows:
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 should not be interpreted to 
authorize an exemption from generally applicable law that imposes the religious views, 
habits, or practices of one party upon another;
(2) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 should not be interpreted to 
authorize an exemption from generally applicable law that imposes meaningful harm, 
including dignitary harm, on a third party; and
(3) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 should not be interpreted to 
authorize an exemption that permits discrimination against other persons, including 
persons who do not belong to the religion or adhere to the beliefs of those to whom the 
exemption is given.
Id.
72 See, e.g., id.
73 See France Burkini: Highest Court Suspends Ban, BBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37198479.
74 See id. “The 1905 constitution aims to separate Church and state. It enshrines secularism 
in education but also guarantees the freedom of religion and freedom to exercise it. The original 
text made no reference to clothing.” Id.
75 Ben Quinn, French Police Make Woman Remove Clothing on Nice Beach Following 
Burkini Ban, GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2016), 
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to don the Burkini was subject to a fine and removal from a public beach simply for 
wearing clothing of their choice and exercising76 her religion.77 To the chagrin of many 
French citizens, the ban went into effect and the fine was imposed.78 The French 
justified their ban of the religious swimwear because they believed that women 
wearing Burkinis were not wearing “‘an outfit respecting good morals and 
secularism.’”79 Ultimately, the ban did not last, as a constitutional court overturned 
it.80 The Burkini Ban is an excellent example of the type of regulation the United 
States’ own RFRAs may have been intended to protect, and the result is a happy one. 
An observer can be satisfied with a result like this because the women exercising their 
religion and wearing Burkinis at the beach were harming absolutely no one. This is a 
fine example of a state using its judicial power to protect an individual from 
government overreach.81 But if all cases were as easy as this one, this Note would be 
unnecessary.
Next, in Northern Ireland, a case arose involving incidents that were strikingly like 
those seen in the United States. A local couple working as bakers refused to serve a 
cake for a same-sex wedding on the grounds that it violated their religious beliefs and 
freedoms.82 When challenged in court, the couple lost their original case and their 
subsequent appeal.83 The appellate court stated that “the original judgment had been 
correct in finding that ‘as a matter of law’ [the bakers] had ‘discriminated against the 
respondent directly on the grounds of sexual orientation contrary to [local law].’”84
This decision did not question the trial court’s opinion that held, despite the bakers’ 
                                                          
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/french-police-make-woman-remove-
burkini-on-nice-beach.
76 The use of “exercise” is poignantly chosen and relates to the argument proposed in 
Section III.
77 See David Gauthier-Villars et al., France Reveals Details on Attacker in Nice, WALL ST.
J. (July 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/terror-attack-in-nice-on-bastille-day-kills-
dozens-1468569739.
77 Quinn, supra note 75.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See Aurelien Breeden & Lilia Blaise, Court Overturns “Burkini” Ban in French Town,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/world/europe/france-
burkini-ban.html. “In its ruling, the court, known as the Council of State, found that the ban in 
the town of Villeneuve-Loubet violated civil liberties, including freedom of movement and 
religious freedom, and that officials had failed to show that the swimwear posed a threat to 
public order.” Id.
81 See id.
82 Claire Williamson, Ashers Bakery Same-Sex Cake Appeal Loss: McArthurs Say Case 
“Undermines Free Speech”—Gay Activist Gareth Lee Breaks Silence, BELFAST TELEGRAPH 
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“genuine and deeply held” religious views, the business was not above the law.85 This 
case illustrates the importance of enacting laws that do not allow certain harmful 
conduct even if motivated by a religious belief.86 Secondly, this case illustrates that no 
individual should be exempt from laws or general standards because of their religious 
beliefs. Northern Ireland provides an example demonstrating that a society, even one 
with a deep history of religious confrontations, should not tolerate religiously 
motivated conduct that is harmful to a third party.87
Finally, the limitation on conduct motivated by religious beliefs finds relevance in 
another realm of life: public health. For decades, parents in Australia were exempted 
from vaccinating their children because of their religious beliefs.88 In 2015, the 
government removed this exemption, leaving medical grounds the sole exemption 
from vaccination.89 Rather than an outright ban, the Australian government decided to 
narrow welfare eligibility for those who do not vaccinate their children.90 In justifying 
the government’s decision, the Health Minister stated, “I believe most parents have 
genuine concerns about those who deliberately choose not to vaccinate their children 
and put the wider community at risk . . . .”91 This justification is enlightening because 
the health minister is implying?as will be argued infra?that the harm caused to 
others by not vaccinating a child is more important than the underlying religious 
belief.92 While vaccines are not necessarily within the purview of this Note, they hold 
relevance to the United States because all states except Mississippi and West Virginia 
                                                          
85 “Gay Cake” Row: Judge Rules Against Ashers Bakery, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-32791239.
86 This Note further discusses this idea in Section III, infra.
87 See “Gay Cake” Row, supra note 85.
88 See Elahe Izadi, Religious Vaccination Exemptions Will Completely End in Australia,
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-
faith/wp/2015/04/20/religious-vaccination-exemptions-will-completely-end-in-
australia/?utm_term=.64bf80ed98ad. “‘It’s up to each person who practices Christian Science 
to choose the form of health care he or she wants,’ reads the official Web site of Christian 
Science. ‘Many Christian Scientists decide to pray first about every challenge—including health 
issues—and find it effective.’” Id.
89 Shalailah Medhora, Vaccination Crackdown: Australia Announces End to Religious 





92 See id. This idea is based on the concept of community or “herd” immunity. See
Community Immunity, FFF ENTERPRISES (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.fffenterprises.com/news/articles/article-2016-10-03.html, which states:
When a critical portion of a community is immunized against a contagious disease, most 
members of the community are protected against that disease because there is little 
opportunity for an outbreak. Even those who are not eligible for certain vaccines—such 
as infants, pregnant women, or immunocompromised individuals—get some protection 
because the spread of contagious disease is contained.
Id.
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allow religious exemptions to vaccinations.93 Australia’s justification strikes at the 
heart of this Note’s theme: some conduct is so detrimental to others in society that it 
should not be protected conduct under religious freedom justifications that benefit just 
one party.
These three examples are not binding precedent and do not necessarily represent a 
worldwide trend. However, these examples of how other western countries handle 
religious disputes offer an image of the balance that should be the ideal goal of the 
United States. The French Burkini example demonstrates that countries are capable of 
protecting the individual expressing her religion in a way that is not harmful for 
anyone else. Both the Australia and Northern Ireland examples provide a limited scope 
of what can be considered protected Religious Freedom rights when that conduct 
embodies harm to another citizen.
III. ARGUMENT
The legal framework in the United States too strongly favors protecting individual 
religious rights, and therefore cases like Paul Mathis’s might not end with the same 
result. The United States needs action to quell this resurgence and shift the balance of 
interests to a more moderate position. Although there is no right way to take such 
action, below are a few possible paths.
A. Rethinking the “Exercise of Religion”
1. Excluding Harmful Conduct from the “Exercise of Religion” by Judicial 
Interpretation of Its Plain Language
At least in some part, an overly broad interpretation of RFRA statutes is to blame 
for some of the laws’ harmful and discriminatory effects.94 Like other statutes, RFRAs 
employ ambiguous language, specifically grounded in the term “exercise of 
religion.”95 To illustrate the ambiguity, the Arkansas legislature defines the exercise 
of religion in its RFRA as “mean[ing] religious exercise.” 96 The federal RFRA defines 
                                                          
93 Hope Lu, Note, Giving Families Their Best Shot: A Law-Medicine Perspective on the 
Right to Religious Exemptions from Mandatory Vaccination, 63 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV.
869, 886 (2013); States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School 
Immunization Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Dec. 20, 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx. For an 
example of a state that provides for religious exemptions, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3313.671(B)(4) (West 2018) (“A pupil who presents a written statement of the pupil’s parent or 
guardian in which the parent or guardian declines to have the pupil immunized for reasons of 
conscience, including religious convictions, is not required to be immunized.”).
94 See Travis Gasper, A Religious Right to Discriminate: Hobby Lobby and “Religious 
Freedom” as a Threat to the LGBT Community, 3 TEX. A&M L. R. 395, 410 (2015). In 
discussing the majority’s approach allowing the exemption in Hobby Lobby, the author states 
that “[t]he majority takes a subjective approach to the question of substantial burdens on 
sincerely held beliefs: if a corporation says it is a substantial burden, it is a substantial burden. 
No judicial inquiry is required. Essentially, this amounts to a ‘grant of exemption without real 
examination.’” Id.
95 See, e.g., Erin McClam, Religious Freedom Restoration Act: What You Need to Know,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/indiana-religious-
freedom-law-what-you-need-know-n332491.
96 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16–123–403(2) (2018).
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the term slightly more narrowly: “[t]he term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise 
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”97
While statutory language often needs a level of flexibility, RFRAs tend not to place 
any restraint on what type of conduct may be considered a religious exercise.98 Albeit 
flexible, these broad definitions give little guidance to courts on how to apply the 
statutes with any sort of reservation. These statutes render almost any conduct to be 
considered a protected religious exercise, even if it is harmful to another citizen.99
The judicial system compounds this problem because courts seem to think that 
anything but broad deference to an individual’s religious100 belief is bad policy.101 In 
her dissent in Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg asserted that “[t]here is an overriding 
interest, I believe, in keeping the courts ‘out of the business of evaluating the relative 
merits of differing religious claims.’”102 Thus, when the federal courts analyze a RFRA 
claim, they defer broadly to the statutory definition that the term “‘exercise of religion’ 
include[s] ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief.’”103 Scholars, particularly those who believe that courts 
should evaluate certain beliefs if they cause harm to others, have challenged this 
stance.104 Although the notion that courts should assess certain religious beliefs is 
worthy of thought, that notion seems to bypass the idea that the United States should 
allow beliefs, even harmful ones, to be held freely.105 Assessing the belief is not 
                                                          
97 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A) (2018).
98 See id. The idea that the federal definition protects “any” religious exercise seems to 
imply that it is all-encompassing, but that cannot be a workable situation.
99 But see Idaho v. Cordingley, 302 P.3d 730, 745–46 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). The court here 
had no problem saying that smoking marijuana is not an exercise of religion for the Church of 
Cognitive Therapy. Id. The court seemed to rely on the “religion” aspect of his claim. Id.
However, when reading between the lines of the opinion, one gets the sense that what the court 
really does not like is the conduct of smoking marijuana. See id. It is hard to say that the court 
would come to a different conclusion if the religious exercise or religion was a tattoo of a 
marijuana leaf.
100 Even the definition of “religion” is hotly contested. Some commentators have said that
the courts should not, or even cannot, define religion. Compare Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining 
Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions 
and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, 
and Anthropology, 83 NORTE DAME L. REV. 123, 145 (2007), with Jane M. Ritter, The Legal 
Definition of Religion: From Eating Cat Food to White Supremacy, 20 TOURO L. REV. 751, 757 
(2004) (“The Supreme Court has held that a belief system need not have a concept of a Supreme 
Being or afterlife. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that purely ‘ethical or moral’ beliefs 
can be religious if held with the strength and fervor of religious convictions.”).
101 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).
102 Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982)).
103 Id. at 2762 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A)).
104 See, e.g., Gasper, supra note 94, at 416 (“Congress should amend RFRA so that courts 
are permitted to assess the belief being asserted and contrast it with the potential harm if an 
exemption is allowed. In doing so, RFRA can return to its purpose of protecting religious 
freedom, while not being used as a tool to perpetuate discrimination.”).
105 Usman, supra note 100, at 146.
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necessary because analyzing conduct is the point. This Note proposes that no matter 
the belief, certain conduct should be excluded as a protected “exercise” of that belief 
when that conduct harms a third party.
This argument proposes that certain conduct motivated by a religious belief should 
not always constitute a protected “exercise”106 of religion regardless of whether the 
motivating belief is sincerely held or central to a belief system. The courts have yet to 
properly address the plain language and dictionary definition of the word “exercise.” 
One of the definitions Merriam-Webster offers for the word “exercise” is “a
performance or activity having a strongly marked secondary or ulterior aspect.”107 This 
common definition implies that to “exercise” something, a link between the conduct 
and the secondary or ulterior aspect must exist. Thus, by adhering to its plain language, 
certain conduct?even if religiously motivated?will not meet the criteria for the 
“exercise of religion” because the conduct is missing a traditional and fundamental 
connection with the secondary aspect (religion). Recent relevant examples might 
include a for-profit corporation firing or hiring an individual.108 For-profit corporations 
hire and fire individuals all the time, and the central purpose of that conduct is for the 
employees to act as agents and help the company earn revenue. With these practices,
the link between religion and conduct is so attenuated that it should not be seen as 
connected, even if the hiring or firing is motivated by a religious belief. And because 
it is not connected, it should not be protected.
Admittedly, it is wholly possible that a religious observer would say that his entire 
life is devoted to religion and his daily conduct is nothing but an embodiment of that 
devotion.109 That position may be true for some people, and while such a position 
should not necessarily be discouraged, a society cannot legally protect all religiously 
motivated conduct without question. Evaluating a person’s conduct rather than the 
belief to which the conduct is associated is intrinsically fair. With such a view, 
religious beliefs would be treated equally because courts would focus on external 
manifestations toward third parties, not the motivating belief itself.
This Note has already touched on the theory that religiously motivated conduct 
does not automatically equate to a religious “exercise.”110 In her dissent in Hobby 
Lobby, Justice Ginsburg alludes to this idea: “I would confine religious exemptions 
under that Act to organizations formed ‘for a religious purpose,’ ‘engage[d] primarily 
in carrying out that religious purpose,’ and not ‘engaged . . . substantially in the 
                                                          
106 This would not be the first time a single word upended a legal theory. In an opinion by 
Justice Scalia, the jurisprudence of the Confrontation Clause was dramatically changed simply 
by rethinking the word “testimonial.” See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
107 Definition of Exercise, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/exercise.
108 An exception would be eating, as many major religions impose dietary restrictions. See, 
e.g., Laura Clark, People Ate Pork in the Middle East Until 1,000 B.C.—What Changed?,
SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/people-ate-pork-
middle-east-until-1000-bcwhat-changed-180954614/. However, such mundane acts are moot 
because they pose no external harm to others.
109 See Ross Douthat, Defining Religious Liberty Down, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/opinion/sunday/douthat-defining-religious-liberty-
down.html.
110 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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exchange of goods or services for money beyond nominal amounts.’”111 Justice 
Ginsburg seems to indicate that certain conduct without a religious “purpose” should 
not be exempted.112 Her language is another way of stating that some conduct simply 
is not an “exercise” of religion. This method of thinking is not the most effective way 
to quell discrimination and harmful conduct because the discretion of an individual 
judge still governs. However, by rethinking the approach, as well as the plain language 
and the dictionary definition of “exercise,” a court does not need to wait for the 
legislature to enact an amendment to quell discrimination.
The justification for limiting what the United States should define as the “exercise” 
of religion parallels the jurisprudence surrounding the regulation of speech, another 
prong of the First Amendment. As even laypeople know, the First Amendment 
protects the freedom of speech.113 What is less widely known, even among lawyers, is 
how rigidly those protections extend into conduct (commonly referred to as 
“expressive conduct”).114 The protection of conduct through the Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment has been summed up nicely:
The First Amendment protects far more than the spoken and written word. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the expression of an 
idea through conduct is entitled to the protection of the First Amendment if 
the conduct is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication”. . . 
the Court has found that activities such as burning a flag as a form of 
political protest, attaching a peace sign to an American flag, and wearing a 
black armband to protest the Vietnam War are all constitutionally 
protected.115
Though expressive conduct is protected through the First Amendment, those
protections are not limitless, allowing the government to regulate that conduct even if 
the conduct contains significant elements of expression like those actions quoted 
above.116 If a government regulation “is not targeted at the expression conveyed, but 
at the conduct associated with the expression, then the regulation is considered 
content-neutral and something less than ‘full First amendment protection’ is afforded 
the expressive activity.”117 In United States v. O’Brien, the Supreme Court formulated 
a test that illustrates when expressive conduct may be regulated.118 The test lists four 
elements:
                                                          
111 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805–06 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Spencer v. World Vision Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 748 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kleinfeld, 
J., concurring)).
112 See id.
113 Peter Moore, First Amendment Is the Most Important, and Well Known, Amendment,
YOUGOV (Apr. 12, 2016), https://today.yougov.com/news/2016/04/12/bill-rights/.
114 Jane R. Bambauer, The Relationships Between Speech and Conduct, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1941, 1941, 1943 (2016).
115 Kevin Case, “Lewd and Immoral”: Nude Dancing, Sexual Expression, and the First 
Amendment, 81 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1188.
118 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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(1) [T]he regulation is “within the constitutional power of the government”; 
(2) the regulation “furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest”; (3) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression”; and (4) the incidental restrictions on First Amendment 
freedoms are no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.119
This Note does not focus on the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, but it is 
illustrative that the Court has discussed the concept of conduct as an element apart 
from a First Amendment right and found a means through the O’Brien test to explicitly 
limit that conduct.120 This Note is not proposing that the O’Brien test is or should be 
applicable to conduct motivated by religious beliefs. The relevance of the Speech 
Clause is to demonstrate that American jurisprudence will not be venturing into 
uncharted waters for simply limiting conduct, even if an individual constitutional 
right—or even the First Amendment—protects the underlying motivation for that 
conduct.121
2. Excluding Harmful Conduct from the “Exercise” of Religion by Legislative 
Enactments
Although federal courts have ruled in favor of arguments based on RFRAs, with 
aging justices, new justices may soon bring to the Court a different view. Additionally, 
some states with RFRA legislation that have yet to see a case decided could quash 
discrimination with existing RFRA language.122 None of that is certain, though, and 
until such changes occur, states with RFRA legislation on the books can reasonably 
amend them.123 Some jurisdictions have statutory language supporting the proposition 
that the “exercise of religion” is not all-encompassing and therefore can be limited.  
For example, the Indiana RFRA has a section called “Anti-Discrimination 
Safeguards” which reads:
This chapter does not:
(1) authorize a provider to refuse to offer or provide services, facilities, use 
of public accommodations, goods, employment, or housing to any member 
or members of the general public on the basis of race, color, religion, 
                                                          
119 Case, supra note 115, at 1189 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77).
120 Id. at 1191.
121 Interestingly, the O’Brien test regulating speech is merely an intermediate scrutiny test, 
id. at 1188, which is an easier burden for the government to meet rather than the blanket strict 
scrutiny test set forth in RFRA legislation explained above. See supra note 24 and 
accompanying text.
122 See Jeff Guo, Here’s How to Use Religious Freedom Laws to Fend Off a Gay 
Discrimination Suit, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/04/03/heres-how-to-use-religious-
freedom-laws-to-fend-off-a-gay-discrimination-suit/?utm_term=.43bc0f839893.
123 The “Anti-Discrimination Safeguards” listed below were an amendment to Indiana’s 
RFRA after backlash and fears that the RFRA could permit discrimination. Tony Cook et al., 
Indiana Governor Signs Amended ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/02/indiana-religious-freedom-law-deal-
gay-discrimination/70819106/.
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ancestry, age, national origin, disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or United States military service;
(2) establish a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution for refusal 
by a provider to offer or provide services, facilities, use of public 
accommodations, goods, employment, or housing to any member or 
members of the general public on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, 
age, national origin, disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or 
United States military service . . . . 124
This safeguard notably applies to a “provider,” i.e. “one (1) or more individuals, 
partnerships, associations, organizations, limited liability companies, corporations, 
and other organized groups of persons.”125 This amendment is an excellent illustration 
that the definition of “exercise of religion” can be limited by the legislature to exclude 
certain conduct, especially discriminatory conduct by individuals and commercial 
organizations.126 Even though the Indiana legislature does not address the Hobby 
Lobby issue of access to contraceptives, such a definition is a major step in the right 
direction.
Anti-discrimination safeguards are not the end of legislative enactments, and other 
jurisdictions have safeguards against frivolous claims. In Tennessee’s RFRA 
provision, the Tennessee legislature provided a section that reads:
Any person found by a court with jurisdiction over the action to have 
abused the protections of this section by filing a frivolous or fraudulent 
claim may be assessed the government entity’s court costs, if any, and may 
be enjoined from filing further claims under this section without leave of 
court.127
This exclusion implies that “religious exercise” does not always include such broad 
deference to religious beliefs as seen in the cases above.128 If a court can find a 
religious claim frivolous, then the court is permitted to balk on giving broad deference 
to every claim the religious believer asserts in court.129 This sort of enactment, at the 
very least, allows a court to inquire into the facts of a case to see whether the religious 
observer’s conduct is a pretext for other motives.
Thus, the trend has already begun; the reactions in the cases previously mentioned 
show a political backlash to RFRAs, and legislatures are narrowing the definition of 
RFRAs. This trend should continue, and legislatures should include language in RFRA 
statutes protecting religious beliefs while excluding harmful conduct to protect 
minority and vulnerable populations.
                                                          
124 IND. CODE. § 34–13–9–0.7(1)–(2) (2018).
125 Id. at § 34–13–9–7.5.
126 See id. at § 34–13–9–0.7.
127 TENN. CODE. ANN. § 4–1–407(f) (2018).
128 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2756 (2014).
129 See Indiana Prisoner’s First Amendment Religion Claim Dismissed as Frivolous, PRISON 
LEGAL NEWS (May 15, 2007), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2007/may/15/indiana-
prisoners-first-amendment-religion-claim-dismissed-as-frivolous/.
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B. Courts Adjudicating Religious Discrimination Claims Between Private Parties 
Violates the Establishment Clause of the Constitution
The conclusion that the United States protectionist RFRA scheme has gone too far 
has ties with other clauses of the Constitution. When a court rules in favor of a 
religious believer in a suit between private parties (such as the district court decision 
in R.G. & G.R. Funeral Home130) rather than against a government regulation, that 
court necessarily is valuing one religious belief over another.131 Preferential treatment 
to beliefs and values contravenes another prong of the First Amendment that forbids 
the government from “respecting an establishment of religion.”132 Under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the state “‘may not aid, foster, or 
promote one religion or religious theory against another.’”133 Generally, when the 
court values a religious belief against a law or regulation, it will not run into the issue 
of favoring a religious belief over another because the law or regulation is in theory 
neutral and secular.134 However, in a discrimination or a refusal of service suit 
motivated by religion, the nature of the suit in fact makes it a controversy between two 
parties and their ideals. If the court rules in favor of the religious discriminator, then 
the court has valued the religious discriminator’s religious belief as holding more 
weight and value than the victim and his beliefs.
Striking down a law based on the Establishment Clause is nothing new. The court 
in Barber v. Bryant135 grounded its decision in the Establishment Clause to hold
unconstitutional the Mississippi law that protected discriminatory religious beliefs.136
The court held that the discriminatory law “violates the Establishment Clause because 
it chooses sides in this internal debate . . . the [s]tate is inserting itself into any number 
of intrafaith doctrinal disputes, tipping the scales toward some believers and away 
from others. That is something it cannot do.”137 The court goes on to say that “‘[t]he 
people’s religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government,’”138 and even 
though the court acknowledged an overwhelming majority of Christians in 
                                                          
130 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. 
Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018). The 
EEOC was the other party to the litigation, but this does not distract from the fact that the 
ultimate dispute was between the transgender employee and the employer-funeral home. See id.
131 See id. at 841.
132 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
133 Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 687 (S.D. Miss. 2016) (quoting Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)). The court also states that “[t]he Establishment Clause is 
violated because persons who hold contrary religious beliefs are unprotected—the State has put 
its thumb on the scale to favor some religious beliefs over others. Showing such favor tells ‘non-
adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community . . . .’” Id. at 688 
(quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10 (2000)).
134 See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb–4 (1993).
135 Barber, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677.
136 Id. at 719.
137 Id.
138 Id. (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)).
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Mississippi, the law could not stand.139 This reasoning is relevant when thinking about 
the implications of courts sanctioning religiously motivated discrimination. Because 
RFRAs revolve around the sincerely held belief of the religious believer and the 
substantial burden placed upon that belief, the court can lose sight of the other beliefs 
that others may hold.140 If the legal system can recognize that the victim of religiously 
motivated discrimination may have a belief system of his own (even if dormant), the 
courts may have an easier time shutting down harmful RFRA claims.
Some commentators have argued RFRAs do not violate the Establishment Clause 
of the Constitution.141 This conclusion relies on the fact that RFRAs in general do not 
violate the Establishment Clause because the government is not endorsing religion as 
a whole even if religion may benefit through such legislation.142 The argument 
provides that “[w]hile it is true that religion may profit from [RFRAs,] . . . the Court 
on numerous occasions has confirmed that a law does not violate the Establishment 
Clause merely because it has the net result of benefiting religion.”143 In following, and 
distinguishing, that principle, RFRAs do not violate the Establishment Clause on their 
face; however, they could in some circumstances because courts become intolerant of 
legislation “where the government has exhibited hostility toward a specific religious 
group or has favored or promoted religion . . . .”144 As applied to certain situations, the 
government, through the courts and legislation, is favoring one religious belief over 
another. 145 In R.G. & G.R. Funeral Home, the employer believed “the Bible teaches 
that a person’s sex (whether male or female) is an immutable God-given gift and that 
it is wrong for a person to deny his or her God-given sex.”146 Presumably, the Plaintiff-
employee believed the exact opposite because he was living his life accordingly. 
Ultimately, when ruling that the employer was entitled to its RFRA defense, the 
district court decided that the employer’s belief prevailed. There, we can say that the 
district court decision offended the Establishment Clause not simply because it 
                                                          
139 Id. at 712. The court explains that some Mississippians might believe that, because of 
their Christian majority, it might be fitting to have Christian polices and that “the Establishment 
Clause is a technicality” to allow atheists to thwart that effort. Id. However, the true intention 
of the Establishment Clause was not to protect minority faiths; it was to protect Christians from 
other Christians, and minority faiths were added later. Id. at 712–13.
140 Id. at 717 (acknowledging that the belief system integrated in “HB 1523 favors Southern 
Baptist over Unitarian doctrine, Catholic over Episcopalian doctrine, and Orthodox Judaism 
over Reform Judaism doctrine, to list just a few examples.”).
141 See, e.g., Gary S. Gildin, A Blessing in Disguise: Protecting Minority Faiths Through 
State Religious Freedom Non-Restoration Acts, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 469 (2000).
142 Id. at 472.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 469.
145 See generally Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 
2018). Once again, the definition of “religion” is very broad. “[T]o be a religion, a belief system 
need not have a concept of a God or a Supreme Being, or afterlife. Purely ‘moral and ethical 
beliefs’ can be a religion, provided that ‘they are held with the strength of religious 
convictions.’” Bernard E. Jacques, Discrimination on the Basis of Religion Is Prohibited! But 
What Is Religion?, 82 CONN. B.J. 365, 370 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
146 R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d at 848.
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss4/7
2018] TIPPED SCALES 773
afforded a net benefit to religion, but because the court gave preference to one 
particular religious viewpoint over another, which is an act that any branch of the 
government should not be able to do. What is more, even allowing business 
organizations to assert RFRAs as a defense violates Establishment Clause principles 
because when courts allow business entities to assert RFRAs as a defense to their own 
actions, courts allow one belief to prevail over another.147 Even if an organization is 
organized as a small partnership or the most closely held corporation, individuals 
holding directorships or shares of the entity may possess different religious views. 
Thus, allowing certain businesses to assert these claims may run afoul of 
Establishment Clause principles because the court is assuming, presuming, allowing
to prevail, or favoring one religious view held by certain individual parties within the 
group while silencing the others.
Courts should use the Establishment Clause reasoning in Bryant148 when deciding 
cases like Hobby Lobby and R.G & G.R. Funeral Home. These cases follow as a 
logical outgrowth of Bryant: if a United States District Court can hold a law invalid 
for violating the Establishment Clause due to its potential harm, then it certainly can 
do so as applied when the harm is actual. Despite RFRA text saying otherwise,149 when 
applied to certain situations, the state favors a certain religious belief over another 
when it sanctions religiously motivated discrimination. When confronted with a case 
like this, the court should hold that RFRA is unconstitutional.
In sum, courts need to be mindful of the Establishment Clause when reviewing a 
RFRA claim. If the suit involves an actor who has discriminated against another on 
the basis of a religious belief, it is a truism that the victim of discrimination is also 
acting in accordance with her beliefs. In other words, a wedding cake baker who 
decides to deny service to an LGBT customer on the basis of religion is acting in 
accordance with his own belief that same-sex marriage is wrong. However, the LGBT 
customer who wishes to buy the cake is also acting in accordance with her belief (and 
likely religious belief) that same-sex marriage is not wrong, and these two individuals 
could be members of the same religion or even the same sect. When a court decides a 
case like this, it favors one belief system over the other and offends the Constitution. 
Therefore, allowing someone to discriminate based on a religious belief is not only 
immoral, but is necessarily unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a society, the United States can do a better job of balancing a religious 
believer’s rights with the rights and dignities of third parties who are undeniably 
harmed by certain beliefs. While staying true to the tradition of freedom of 
conscience,150 the United States can allow beliefs to be held, expressed, and debated 
                                                          
147 See id. at 841.
148 Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 688 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
149 The federal RFRA states that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, 
interpret, or in any way address that portion of the First Amendment prohibiting laws respecting 
the establishment of religion (referred to in this section as the “Establishment Clause”).” 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–4 (1993).
150 See Charles C. Haynes, History of Religious Liberty in America, NEWSEUM INST. (Dec. 
26, 2002), http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-
religion/religious-liberty-in-america-overview/history-of-religious-liberty-in-america/.
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without question. But what we cannot and should not allow for is a society to be 
inclusive to some individuals and exclusive to others. This Note proposes that the 
answer is to restrict the instances in which the United States allows discriminatory 
religious beliefs to manifest into conduct that harms others. In allowing someone to 
quote a Bible verse as justification for a discriminatory termination, our society is 
treading dangerously toward theocracy.
However, all is not lost. The United States can achieve a level of fairness for all 
citizens through reasonable means. The law can limit what qualifies as a protected 
“exercise” of religion by judicial interpretation of its plain language, by enacting 
reasonable laws and amendments excluding discriminatory conduct from the federal 
RFRA’s purview, or some combination of the two. In addition, society must recognize 
that when an individual asserts a religious right in a way that harms another, the 
harmed party may hold conflicting or directly opposing views. Accordingly, a judicial 
decision on these sorts of facts contravenes the Establishment Clause of the 
Constitution, and thus courts should not decide these cases because they will 
inevitably favor one belief system over another. These methods are sensible ways to 
assure that the religious believer cannot hijack the legal system as a means to use his 
sincere religious beliefs to create his own law.
The United States is not shackled to the idea that an individual’s religiously 
motivated conduct enjoys unfettered deference, and the government will not 
contravene statutory law or the Constitution if it denies the right to harm others based 
upon a religious belief. It is quite the contrary: it will be defending the institutional 
integrity of the United States along with the dignity of all citizens.
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